Withdrawal or termination of authority, status, credentials, permissions or trust state.
Separating autonomous execution from independent enforcement makes organizational authority more testable, but verifiable Law, approvals, and effects do not themselves establish the legitimacy of the sovereign organization or provide external redress.
Permission can establish that an agent may invoke a capability, but institutional authority requires a governed state that binds purpose, delegation, evidence, policy, obligations, and continuity to the action the institution is prepared to own.
Local compliance is not a compositional property: when institutional outcomes emerge from coupled agents, governance must attach observability, revocable authority, containment, and accountability to the population and workflow, not only to each component.
AI oversight becomes governable only when monitoring, verification, authorization, and commit authority remain distinct, independently evidenced, and unable to silently widen one another's powers.
JAZB makes machine authority governable by turning provenance, delegation, revocation, jurisdiction, actuation, and evidence into explicit control objects, but organizational authority becomes legitimate governance only when the human sovereign root is itself constrained, contestable, and externally accountable.
This is a strong trust-architecture proposal because it refuses to collapse verification into reliance, but it remains a governance blueprint rather than deployable national infrastructure until legal authority, registry operation, liability, and cross-sector redress are resolved.
The Decision Authority Charter is a credible route from accountability language to executable control, but its real governance test is whether named owners and preauthorized intervention still work when business, security, legal, and operational authorities genuinely conflict.
The paper is strong on making control executable, but incomplete as governance: moving authority out of the agent does not solve the problem unless the control plane's own power to define, enforce, revoke, and contest policy is legitimate and constrained.
When an agent learns what to remember from later conversational rewards, memory becomes a policy over the user's future context and therefore requires governable rights to inspect, correct, delete and constrain that policy.
If interaction topology and message history can create behavior absent in isolated agents, assurance cannot stop at the model boundary: the relationship, protocol and composition become part of the governed system.
A continuity model can prevent downstream authority manufacture, but a governable system still needs explicit rules for how legitimate authority is created, revoked, disputed, and restarted.
Split-knowledge identity can make an agent traceable without making its principal visible to business actors, but traceability becomes legitimate accountability only when tracing, revocation, delegated authority, and redress are independently governable.
The paper correctly identifies that advanced agents redistribute control by internalising goals, identity, deliberation, and learning, but it mistakes architectural visibility for governability: an inspectable module is not an accountable institution unless authority, constraint, revocation, evidence, and redress are executable around it.
At population scale, an "agent layer" only becomes governance-grade when delegation is cryptographically bounded, discoverable, and revocable; otherwise you just automated intermediaries and fraud.
A governed delegation must remain bounded, current, observable and revocable throughout execution rather than being treated as valid merely because an initial credential, token or policy grant existed.
The archive repeatedly finds that delegation proposals are more complete at issuance than at expiry, suspension, revocation, restoration, dispute and evidence preservation.
Agent governance proposals increasingly define duties and delegated authority, but operational revocation, evidence preservation, correction, restoration and redress remain less specified than initial authorization.
A governance system that can grant authority but cannot reliably withdraw or contest it creates persistent decision rights without a complete lifecycle.
Provenance-bounded execution can prevent downstream authority expansion, but it does not establish who may create a new authority origin, under what evidence, or how competing, renewed or disputed origins are reconciled.
Continuity can prove that execution stayed within an origin while leaving the institutional legitimacy of that origin outside the model.
Both reviews examine agent infrastructure through governance requirements around bounded authority, accountability and trust rather than agent capability alone.
Both reviews treat the agent model as institutionally incomplete when authority, accountability and governance are not made operational.
Both distinguish agent identification and attribution from current, action-specific authority, while exposing registry, revocation and accountability dependencies.
The continuity paper generalizes the earlier provenance-bounded execution model from origin-bounded delegation into sequential, forked, joined and policy-mediated authority state transitions.
Both require delegated authority to remain bounded during execution, while the loyalty review adds duties, conflicts, revocation and redress that the continuity model leaves outside its invariant.
Both separate cryptographic verification from the relying institution's governance decision and require authority, purpose, current status and institutional responsibility to make acceptance legitimate.
Both treat accountability as an allocation of decision rights and intervention capacity; one specifies named operational decision ownership while the other models responsibility across sequential workflow positions.
Both reject diffuse accountability as sufficient and require institutional mechanisms that turn shared duties into named authority, intervention, evidence and remedy.